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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
The above recommendation should be enacted to foster the speedy
resolution of controversies by arbitration.
CPLR 7503(c): Requirement that application for stay of arbitration be
made within ten days of notice of intention to arbitrate held inappli-
cable where respondent concealed material fact in order to create cover-
age under insurance policy.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co v. Isle-r,192 an
automobile liability insurer applied to stay arbitration which the re-
spondent had demanded pursuant to CPLR 7503(c). Although the pe-
titioner did not comply with the section's ten-day preclusionary rule'93
for an application to stay arbitration, the Appellate Division, Second
Department, allowed the application because the respondent had con-
cealed a "material fact" and attempted to create coverage. The undis-
closed fact was that he had settled with another insurer for damages
arising out of the same accident, thereby terminating coverage under
the insurance agreement with the petitioner.194
The instant decision is one of several recent opinions which hope-
fully will engender a liberalization of the traditionally literal and ex-
acting construction which CPLR 7503(c) has experienced. The ten-day
period has been construed as a statute of limitations, 95 depriving the
1946) (defense to legal action and appeal from adverse determination deemed inconsistent
with asserted intent to arbitrate and thus a waiver and abandonment).
192 38 App. Div. 2d 966, 331 N.Y.S.2d 547 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
193 If the petitioner does not apply to stay arbitration within ten days, he may not
assert inarbitrability in subsequent judicial proceedings, provided that the ten-day time
limit is contained in the notice of intention to arbitrate. The provision is designed to
settle the threshold questions relating to arbitration as soon as possible so that the
proceeding may continue uninterrupted.
194 38 App. Div. 2d at 967, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 549. In so holding, the court declined
to decide whether, absent such concealment, the insurer would have been precluded from
raising the issue of coverage. Id.
Under the standard uninsured motorist endorsement, the parties agree to arbitrate
"whether the insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover such damages,
and if so the amount thereof." The Court of Appeals, in Rosenbaum v. American
Sur. Co., 11 N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.2d 677, 229 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1962), interpreted the
arbitration clause as encompassing only the questions of the negligence of the un-
insured motorist and the extent of recoverable damages should such negligence be
determined. The status of a person as "insured" within the purview of the arbitration
clause has been held to be a condition precedent to arbitration, to be established in a
judicial proceeding rather than before the arbitrator. See Stanley v. MVAIC, 20 App.
Div. 2d 877, 248 N.Y.S.2d 630 (ist Dep't 1964) (mem.); McGuinness v. MVAIC, 32 Misc.
2d 949, 225 N.YS.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1962); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 26
Misc. 2d 859, 207 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960). See also 7 D. BLASHEmLD, Auro-
MOBmE LAW AND PRACrncE 122-41 (1966); Smith, Handling Uninsured Motorist Claims in
New York, 32 ALBANY L. R.V. 96 (1967).
195 See Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc., 31 App. Div. 2d 208,
295 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Ist Dep't 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 898, 249 N.E.2d 477, 301 N.Y-S2d 636
(1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 758, 760 (1970).
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courts of any discretion to extend it.196 It has also been held that the
parties themselves cannot extend the period by agreement. 197
Almost invariably, inattention to the form required by CPLR
7503(c), with respect to both the notice of intention to arbitrate and the
application for a stay, is fatal. 198 However, the Second Department, in
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Granelli,199 recently ignored alleged
technical defects in the demand which were "at most nonprejudicial
irregularities which should be disregarded." 200
This shift in attitude is a welcome one among harried practitioners
who have experienced the often burdensome results of rigid application
of the section. The First Department is also so inclined, as evidenced by
Empire Mutual Insurance Co. v. Levy. 201 Therein, the respondent uti-
lized the notice of intention to arbitrate so as to prevent compliance
with the ten-day provision by the petitioner. The court refused to allow
such manipulation and granted the stay. Although the holding was
limited to the facts, one may infer that courts will be increasingly
sensitive to the equities in particular situations.
CPLR 7511(a): Date of actual delivery of arbitration award must be
stated in pleading ninety-day statute of limitations.
CPLR 7511(a) provides that a party moving to vacate or modify
an arbitration award must do so within ninety days after its delivery to
him. In Ganser v. New York Telephone Co.,20 2 the Appellate Division,
First Department, considered a petition to set aside an arbitration award
rendered on April 30, 1971. The date of delivery of the award was not
alleged or otherwise indicated. The original petition, filed on July 27,
1971, was followed by a motion noticed on August 24, 1971. The Su-
preme Court, New York County, dismissed the petition on the ground
that more than ninety days had elapsed from the date of the award be-
fore the motion to vacate was made. The Appellate Division, First De-
partment, reversed, strictly construing CPLR 7511(a) to require that
106 See CPLR 201.
197 See General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Cerretto, 60 Misc. 2d 216, 303 N.Y.S.2d
223 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1969) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST.
JOHN'S L. Rv. 758, 768 (1970).
198 See, e.g., Chasin v. Chasin, 37 App. Div. 2d 839, 326 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2d Dep't 1971)
(mem.); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Szwec, 36 App. Div. 2d 863, 321 N.Y.S.2d 800
(2d Dep't 1971) (mem.); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keane, 28 App. Div. 2d 703, 280 N.Y.S.2d
972 (2d Dep't 1967) (mem.); Napolitano v. MVAIC, 26 App. Div. 2d 757, 272 N.Y.S.2d
220 (3d Dep't 1966) (mem.); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Neithardt, 24 App. Div. 2d 941, 265
N.Y.S.2d 128 (Ist Dep't 1965) (mem.).
199 37 App. Div. 2d 113, 322 N.YS.2d 390 (2d Dep't 1971).
2001d. at 115, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (dictum).
201 85 App. Div. 2d 916, 316 N.Y.S.2d 24 (Ist Dep't 1970) (mem.), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 536, 549 (1971).
202 39 App. Div. 2d 653, 331 N.Y.S.2d 914 (Ist Dep't 1972) (mem.).
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